Politicians use inflammatory language to manipulate voters via aspects of identity: race, sexuality, gender, religion. Due to differences in values within each of these groups, word choice significantly impacts ideological viewpoints. This literature review’s purpose is to highlight the study of inflammatory language that manipulates the public’s identity. During the World Warâ…¡Era the Nazis used false information to sway the public toward an identity-based agenda. In a stark comparison, representation of race was essential in the fight for civil rights. Thus, where is the moral line drawn in the use of identity politics? If an individual doesn’t have an egalitarian outlook, words are weaponized against different communities. Later in the Reagan Era, Reagan used religious catchphrases to rally the Moral Majority, in which he used the religion of others to his own advantage. Negative tribalism re-occurs as a socio-political trend reaffirmed by trigger concepts. The findings are that politicians from all over the political spectrum use terms that irrationally anger and rally narrow bases. These dog-whistle-like phrases are used in ways that subvert two group identities in one way or another, like the power dynamic between agents and the oppressed. This project investigates the effects of politicians’ diction in contrast with the reaction of different communities. The use of terminology by powerful people, could be a danger to the survival of the democratic process. Political analysts need to be aware of the intersectional relationship between inflammatory language and identity to better understand hostage holding behaviors of each political party. An inflammation of this vocabulary could spark a similar hatred of the past and leave our democracy left in ashes.

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 was passed to protect the rights of incarcerated individuals in the US to freely practice their religion in federal prisons. However, even 22 years after RLUIPA placed a strict scrutiny standard on reviewing inmates; free exercise claims, community organizations have had to repeatedly advocate for civil rights violations in prisons. This project aims to figure out why the free exercise rights of religious minorities are still threatened in the face of strong legislative protection. I will do so first by determining whether there is a bias in RLUIPA decisions for claims made by majoritarian religions, leaving religious minorities with a lower likelihood of success. Then, I will analyze whether the difference in success rates can be explained by a plaintiff's access to resources. Most incarcerated individuals represent themselves in court as they often lack the financial resources necessary for professional legal representation. Pro se plaintiff's often lack the preparation and legal knowledge that goes into a successful court claim. I hypothesize that prisoners with access to more resources, whether it's financial or community-based support, will be more likely to have a successful free exercise claim. My data will be collected from RLUIPA judgements from 2000 to 2022 and compiled into a dataset that includes variables such as the plaintiff's religion, type of representation, and the outcome of the claim. I expect to find that religious minorities will have lower rates of success, and that they will be less likely to have private representation. I also expect that plaintiffs with private representation will have higher rates of success with their RLUIPA claims as compared to pro se plaintiff's. The findings of this research will reveal the difficulties that individuals face in prison because of their religious identity and speak to broader themes of the trust and authority that our political systems give to prisons at the expense of incarcerated individuals' rights. 

Political scientists have rarely considered the intersection of religious organizations and foreign policy. Currently, there is no literature that investigates why religious organizations decide to either support or oppose American wars overseas and why this support can vary within each organization across conflicts. I attempt to answer these questions by testing whether religions are more likely to favor wars with other countries that have smaller groups of same-faith adherents. The social psychology theory of in-group favoritism and an “open-door” incentive to potential proselytization provide a plausible argument for such a relationship. To test this, I analyzed three different denominations of Christianity with a significant presence in the United States and their public position toward specific military conflicts throughout U.S. history. I created an original dataset containing these public positions of support or opposition to a given war along with the existence or size of like-faith communities (i.e., how many of their own church members were present) in the exterior target state of the conflict. I then utilized a multivariate regression analysis to test my theory and determine the relationship between a church’s support for war and the size of same-creed presence in each target state. I expect to find a positive relationship between these two variables, supporting the theories of in-group favoritism and “open-door” proselytization. These findings will contribute to current literature on American public and religious interest group foreign policy attitudes and offer methods for anticipating faith group positions on future military operations.

The American prison system is notorious for the mistreatment and abuse of the incarcerated people left in their care. In the past ten years there have been large pushes for prison reform; yet, these programs have had varying results across states. Why is it that some states have a much higher frequency of sexual assaults in prisons then others? I expect to find that prisons in Democratic-controlled states will have lower rates of sexual assault then their Republican-controlled counterparts. Literature on racial and social justice initiatives point to several differentiating factors between the two parties that aids in explaining this issue. Democrats are more likely to support social welfare and the Black Lives Matter movement, because racial justice activism is important to the Democratic coalition and subsequently their voter base. Additionally, Republican leadership supports tax and social welfare cuts while prison reform depends on subsidization from the government to work. In order to test this theory, I gathered data on sexual assaults in prisons from each state and compared them against each other, controlling for certain factors such as age, population and prison demographic. I ran a multivariate regression to see if Republican-controlled states experience greater frequencies of assault. This study focuses on an underserved population in the United States which greatly deserves thought and attention. Additionally, learning what factors contribute to violence in prisons helps provide a framework for improvements in our judicial system. Through research my goal is to contribute new information to a critical issue that has so far been largely understudied.

As of 2022 there are 103 million displaced people, of which 32.5 million are refugees, and 4.9 million are asylum seekers recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. As the number of displaced people grows, it becomes even more imperative that the United States offers asylum seekers a fair trial in court to pursue refuge in order to comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to uphold strong ethical obligations based on foundational liberal values. However, today the right to seek asylum in U.S. immigration courts is undermined by the stark variation of adjudication rates between immigration judges. In this paper, I use original data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University to examine asylum adjudication variation systemically. Building from social identity theory, I hypothesize that asylum adjudication variation occurs due to the implicit bias exercised by judges based on their personal identities. I define implicit biases as unconscious learned biases that usually take the form of stereotypes and narratives that one automatically associates with particular people. Using a multivariate regression, I examine how the race, gender, political leanings, and religious affiliations of 314 judges correlate with the judges’ adjudication rate as well as the racial makeup of their asylum applicant pool. I expect to find that judges that have the characteristics of white, male, conservative and Christian will be more likely to deny asylum applications and I posit that this will have a disparate impact on asylum seekers who are black, brown, or are coming from majority Muslim countries.

International criminal justice is often criticized for being unfairly selective in prosecuting cases. For instance, all suspects brought before the International Criminal Court in The Hague have come from Africa. This is despite the fact that human rights violations have been reported in many other parts of the world during this same period of time. Although restrictions in time and resources limit international courts’ and tribunals' capacity to prosecute all meritorious cases, the criteria used by the Prosecutors of these courts to determine which cases to pursue and which to disregard remain largely unknown, compromising the legitimacy of international criminal law in its application. This raises the question of why international criminal cases were only initiated in certain cases and not in others, and against particular suspects? To address these questions, this research examines four of the most prominent theories on selectivity in the application of international criminal law, including state capacity, popularity (that the courts will single out people from countries that have a bad reputation in their global affairs while granting leniency to others), crime severity, and victor's justice (countries with powerful positions within the international arena are most likely to escape international scrutiny). Most empirical research examines a single theory in isolation and employs a case study approach. However, I compiled an original dataset that encompasses all cases of international criminal law, from the Nuremberg Trials to the most recent cases of the International Criminal Court in order to test all four major theories systematically. I expect multivariate analysis to provide substantial support for the theory of victor's justice by showing that the power of a country correlates with the likelihood of international interference in the prosecution of international crimes committed in the country.

According to the Corruptions Perception Index, Nepal is ranked 117 out of 180 countries for corruption with 12% of public service users having paid a bribe in the last 12 months. While many studies have analyzed systemic corruption within Nepal, little research has attempted to measure the magnitude of systemic corruption, with particularly limited literature on systemic healthcare corruption. To estimate the prevalence of petty systemic healthcare corruption (i.e. between the public and low-level public officials or doctors), I designed a survey guided by prior United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and European Commission research, and a series of interviews with Nepalis. Bir Hospital was randomly selected among 5 other public hospitals in Kathmandu, and I administered the survey to 41 participants over two days. 43.2% of respondents paid more than they expected, and 68.6% of these respondents felt this payment was outside of their cultural norms. Moreover, 41.7% of the respondents paid cash directly to a doctor, which interviews indicated is atypical. No correlation was found between income and how respondents rated their care; moreover, no statistical significance was found using a t-test between how respondents rated their care and whether they paid cash directly to a doctor. However, odds ratio analysis on whether a payment was outside of cultural norms and whether the desired care was received yielded a ratio of 1.23, indicating that these payments mildly increased the probability of getting the desired care. This, paired with interviews indicating distrust of the hospital system and prior research demonstrating corruption throughout Nepal suggests systemic healthcare corruption in the form of bribes is prevalent, but does not necessarily guarantee better care. Further research must be done to not only determine the efficacy of this survey method, but also the validity of this model.

Donald Trump’s presidency and its divisive legacy on the American government and its citizens continues to plague our society years after he has left office. It is crucial that policymakers and social scientists understand what values or grievances resonated with Trump’s voters and drove the rise of the Make America Great Again movement, in order to ensure that his voters do not continue to feel alienated from mainstream US politics. Through this paper I explore the electoral motivations of the US white working class, building on existing research that studies voting patterns and trends in previous presidential elections. I test two popular competing theories, pocketbook voting and social identity voting, and apply these theories to the context of the 2020 US presidential election. Pocketbook voting posits that voters respond to individual economic incentives and vote for who would benefit them economically, while social identity voting theorizes that individuals vote based on their subjective sense of belonging to an in-group and a desire to distinguish their group from others. I expect to find that white working class Trump voters were motivated by social identity voting, voting for Trump because of racial grievances and status anxieties. To conduct this study, I use a racial threat index and an economic well-being index, drawing from survey data to compare the social and economic grievances of white working class Trump voters. I expect to find that social identity voting, driven by factors such as status anxiety and racial threat, is a stronger electoral motivator than economic incentives, such as changes in wages or employment. Understanding such motivations lets us fight polarization and address the concerns of disenfranchised voters in future elections and in politics more broadly.

Year after year, catastrophic hurricanes rip through the mainland United States and its island territories. And yet, year after year, we hear stories of communities going without electricity or running water for months, disastrous temporary housing units and evacuations, and months-long wait times for immediate needs like food and medical care. Why has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) failed to improve its distribution of disaster relief, even after three major reform bills? This paper seeks to provide an answer by investigating how corporate lobbying may be influencing FEMA’s allocation of relief funds between public and private actors. Considering the lucrative nature of post-disaster contracts awarded to corporations, they may use their lobbying powers to pressure the government to allocate more funds for private contracts and less to its Public Assistance (PA) program, which provides grants directly to state and local governments. FEMA’s preference for private contractors, despite their extensive history of performing inadequate work and defrauding the government, may be a significant part of the agency’s overall dysfunction. I conduct a multivariate regression analysis to determine the relationship between lobbying expenditures from top contractors and FEMA’s allocation of relief funds among public and private sectors between 2004 and 2021. I expect to find a positive relationship between these variables, suggesting lobbying does interfere with the delivery of post-disaster aid. Identifying the private sector’s influence in this area is critical to ensuring communities are properly supported after hurricanes and other natural disasters, which will only increase in frequency due to climate change.

The “Taiwan issue,” a potential breaking point for U.S.-China relations, is essentially about Taiwan’s highly controversial political status and national identification. Historically, the Taiwanese have identified themselves in different ways, as some self-identify as Chinese and some as Taiwanese. However, there has been a significant change in Taiwan’s national identification in recent decades, as people are increasingly self-identifying as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. This paper tries to answer what has led to changes in Taiwan’s national identity. I explore theories of democratization, authoritarian control in mainland China, and elite manipulation through discourse as potential causes for the shift in Taiwan’s national identification. I use democratic indices from the V-Dem dataset to measure degrees of democratization and the political rights and civil liberties indices from Freedom House to measure levels of authoritarian control in mainland China. To measure elite manipulation through discourse in Taiwan, I conduct a content analysis of key concepts related to both identities on Taiwan’s newspapers. I employ these data to test each of the theories in relation to survey results in Taiwan from 1990-2021. To test each of the theories, I conduct a multivariate regression analysis to determine if there is a relationship between each theory and change in Taiwanese national identity. I expect to find a positive correlation between the three potential causes and change in Taiwan’s national identification, which would indicate that democratization, elite manipulation through discourse, and authoritarian control in mainland China has led to the increasing trend of identifying as Taiwanese. Understanding the cause of change in Taiwan’s national identification and how support for the identities change over time provides insights into why and to what extent Taiwan has separated itself from mainland China and helps inform policy implications for both China and the U.S.’ Taiwan policy.

In a liberal and democratic society, unjust policies can be prevented by the people through voting or political action. People in a free society have a default political responsibility to prevent unjust policy in these ways. However, people under a non-democratic regime do not have the means to actively engage in political affairs and therefore do not causally contribute to unjust policy. This paper analyzes the protests against the zero-COVID policy employed by the Chinese government since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. I use three theoretical approaches to examine to what extent people have a moral responsibility to oppose unjust policy. First, people can follow the heroic example of Antigone in Sophocles' tragedy and mount heroic resistance at great personal cost. They can appeal to higher moral values and take up rebellion against the authoritarian government. Second, individuals can honor their social roles despite the state's rules. Doctors should treat the patients even though the zero-Covid policy demands them not to do so. Finally, individuals can seek to preserve truth and inner freedom. This is the approach with the least cost. People should seek truth and be aware of the lies made by the government. In the meantime, they need to protect themselves from being punished by the authoritarian government. These are three models of moral responsibility. I argue that sticking with the truth is the minimum moral requirement for individuals under authoritarian regimes.

The onset of the 21st century brought with it an increasingly authoritarian world. Since 2005, countries making democratic declines outnumbered those making democratic gains. Why is it that, despite seemingly disparate conditions in individual countries, democratic backsliding is globally on the rise? Although this sudden and alarming decline has drawn the attention of many political researchers, there currently lacks a strong scientific consensus on the major catalysts for democratic backsliding. This research project explores whether political and affective polarization influence the quality of democracy experienced by a country. I hypothesize that the amount of polarization within a state significantly impacts the extent to which democratic backsliding occurs. This hypothesis comes from my observations of the United States’ current cultural climate, where high levels of polarization have contributed to political dysfunction on a national level. Polarization appears to undermine democratic norms and principles by discouraging bipartisan cooperation, encouraging politicians with autocratic policies to run for elections, and incentivizing voters to choose partisan interests over democratic ones. To test this theory, I run a multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between political and affective polarization on over 100 countries, all of which were considered to be some form of democracy in the year 2013. I test this analysis against multiple potential confounding variables, such as the income inequality within a state, public support for democracy, and rate of immigration. I expect my evaluation to show a significant positive relationship between a nation’s level of polarization and the rate of democratic decline. Erosion of democracy has real-world significance for citizens. Since this period of democratic backsliding began, election freedom and checks on human rights abuses have deteriorated. It’s important to identify a catalyst for 21st century backsliding because it provides us with a method for preventing further liberalism to occur.

Non-evangelical denominations of Protestantism have experienced unsettling declines in funding and membership since the 1960’s. Seattle churches are no exception. A collective of “progressive” identifying Seattle churches are tackling the organizational issues they face. Together, they are asking questions such as: “How can we disrupt the entrenched Christian elitism that separates our church from the community landscape?” and “How can we reteach our congregations what it means to be in community with other people?” Political scientists and religious scholars have offered many theoretical explanations for why some churches, denominations, or religions thrive when others do not. This paper seeks to quantitatively assess mainstream explanations for progressive Protestant decline by using survey data collected from this local collective of churches. The survey utilizes likert scale questions, which will be analyzed using a logistic regression to understand how individuals relate their political beliefs to their religious beliefs in the context of their congregations.This paper advances three hypotheses: progressive Protestantism decreases theological and political cohesion among their congregations; progressive church-goers develop political beliefs that are less influenced by the church than their conservative counterparts; and lastly that progressive churches have weak self-conceptions of their theological teachings. Progressive theologies inherently encourage open-mindedness and individuality: beliefs that are often corrosive to the ideological strength of a church because they undermine the church's moral authority. I believe that progressive Protestants generally-- and these Seattle churches specifically-- have so diluted the coercive influence of the church, that their congregations are struggling to maintain a cohesive theological outlook. The Christian church undergirds many Americans’ political beliefs. Understanding how a church’s adoption of a progressive theology impacts the organizational strength of a congregation, and the ideological beliefs of the individual are crucial considerations for a country increasingly divided by political polarization.

In this project, I conducted a literature review comparing the strategies the governments of Vietnam and Thailand are implementing to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Southeast Asia is projected to be severely impacted by climate change. In particular, rising sea levels are likely to encroach on lowland coastal regions that account for much of the population and serve as centers of economic activity. Additionally, nations in this region continue to undergo rapid economic growth, and therefore face a dilemma in that the carbon emissions which have largely fueled their quick growth are also contributing to climate change imperiling their populations. The purpose of this study is to compare the climate response of two major growing economies in this region in terms of mitigation and adaptation, and in this manner discover how differences in political structure, national wealth, and the level of specific risk faced by each nation has shaped their climate policies. I conducted research by reviewing policy reports published by these governments, non-governmental organizations, and scholarly articles. My review suggests that both governments have tended to downplay the scale of climate adaptation needed to prepare for the massive population resettlement and economic adjustment from the inundation of several major cities. Additionally, the findings show that Vietnam has undertaken more extensive mitigation efforts than Thailand, in part stemming from a varying response to the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast to Thailand, which responded by further developing fossil fuel infrastructure to pursue greater energy independence, Vietnam worked toward the same aims by expanding green energy sources like wind and hydropower. By understanding the causes of these varying climate responses, we can better identify areas in which further action is needed to bring policy in line with scientific projections and understand how institutional structures influence the success of climate policy.

Climate change has two dimensions: mitigation and adaptation. In spite of progress towards net-zero emissions, climate change is already underway, and its effects are visible through extreme weather events including hurricanes. Many argue policymakers should focus on adaptation along with mitigation. Given that some climate effects are location-specific, adaptation requires that households carefully think about where they buy property, given that an investment in a home is the most important source of household wealth. To minimize property damage, households could take steps to enhance the resilience of their property, which should be reflected in property value. In the absence of federal regulation, only 29 states of the 50 U.S. have enacted laws mandating property owners disclose flood history and risk to a property. Louisiana was among the first states to enact these regulations, while in 2022, Texas strengthened its legislation. What explains this variation in flood disclosure legislation over time and space? Collecting data from federal and non-profit sources, I will examine a slate of factors: state partisanship (control of the legislature and the gubernatorial office) from 2017-2019; percentage of Trump votes in 2016; the number of water-related disasters from 2013-2018; percentage of flood hazard area; in-migration; length of coastline; percentage of forested area; and the number of flood related deaths from 2013-2018. In R, I will conduct linear regression models to estimate the effect and significance of these factors on the response variable: the grade/strength of flood disclosure legislation. I will also conduct a Cox Proportional hazard model to examine the effect of these factors on the passage of flood disclosure legislation. The results of the analysis will provide evidence as to why certain states are more likely to have strong flood disclosure legislation, and what events could result in a state passing flood disclosure legislation.

In the past year climate activists have engaged in increasingly disruptive tactics to try and draw attention to the looming climate crisis. To raise awareness for their cause, activist groups have utilized a variety of confrontational and controversial protest tactics, such as sit-ins, hunger strikes, road blockades, and occupations of crucial industries, for example, airports. However 2022 featured a unique new form of climate protest: art attacks and museum vandalization. This radical new protest tactic is designed to force public attention on the climate crisis by visually destroying and threatening precious artworks. A slew of climate art protests swept news headlines in 2022, drawing both condemnation and admiration. For this project I created a dataset of art attacks and museum vandalism focusing on when, where, and what group executes such attacks with the goal of understanding the context of this new protest phenomenon. Preliminary data was collected by tracking news reports and activist social media posts to determine the relevant data points. The preliminary findings from this project find that all instances of museum vandalism occurred in a 7-month period in 2022, with attacks concentrated in the days leading up to COP27 in November. In total, 39 protests occurred in 11 (primarily European) countries, with the majority occurring in England (7), Italy (8), and Germany (8). Established climate activist groups conducted the majority of these protests, with only a handful of these incidents being perpetrated by individual actors. The activist groups most implicated in the dataset are: Just Stop Oil (England), Letzte Generation (Germany), and Ultima Generazione (Italy), which aligns well with the countries in which the majority of the protests took place. The results of this project could indicate the future of climate protest tactics- and public reception- as the climate crisis worsens and activist groups become more desperate.