The Creative Districts program, managed by the Washington State Arts Commission (ArtsWA), is a growing place-based investment strategy offering state certification to geographically defined areas focused on cultural and creative enterprises. ArtsWA provides technical and professional assistance, marketing, and funding to certified Creative Districts to encourage localized economic development through tourism and hubs of economic activity. Washington's interpretation of creative economy includes professions with high social capital, such as traditional artists, and professions with high economic capital, such as those of the knowledge economy, which could encourage Creative Districts to use social capital of traditional artistic professions for branding while primarily courting the mobile, economic capital of the knowledge economy. This could increase risk of displacement for artists and long-term residents living in and around Creative Districts. My research analyzes Creative Districts and surrounding areas to determine the level of economic vulnerability, or ability to adapt to economic pressures including increased cost of living, present in residential populations. I created an economic vulnerability index choosing indicators based on academic literature and availability of data through the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates. Using GIS software, I created polygons for each Creative District, input ACS data, calculated a z-score for each indicator, and used spatial analysis tools to identify geographic concentrations of economic vulnerability. I expect to find that Creative Districts and surrounding areas in urban zones score highest on the economic vulnerability index, meaning residents may be at highest risk for displacement due to gentrification. Areas scoring high on the economic vulnerability index would benefit from focused support from ArtsWA and other state agencies to address risk of residential displacement. Additional research is needed to analyze economic vulnerability of existing businesses in Creative Districts and surrounding areas, with special focus on small businesses of local economic, social, and cultural importance.

Over the last decade-and-a-half, China has seen its financial technology (fintech) industry achieve a level of scale and ubiquity without peer among developed economies — Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat Pay, to name a few examples, each enjoy over one billion users, and are deeply integrated into daily life. Yet, by its hybrid nature, fintech presents complex challenges novel to both financial and technology regulation, the dramatic collapse of China’s peer-to-peer lending industry being a case in point. In this context, as much as Chinese firms lead the way in fintech development, Chinese regulators also act as innovators in the yet-undeveloped field of fintech regulation. As such, the study of the Chinese regulatory experience may yield insight into how other nations may develop their own regulatory frameworks towards fintech as an emerging industry. This research investigates the characteristics and challenges of Chinese fintech regulation. Specifically, this research considers the current institutional approach to regulation, the financial risks that current regulation seeks to address, and the effects of said regulation on the fintech industry. Given the novelty of fintech as a regulatory field, this research addresses a new and developing niche within the broader study of Chinese economic policymaking. I utilize a combination of general policy analysis and case study of specific regulatory actions to analyze both the regulatory process and its effect on the fintech industry. Qualitative analysis of regulatory documents and materials is complemented by quantitative analysis of industry-level data in examining both regulatory initiatives and their empirical economic effects upon fintech firms.This research is expected to yield the result that, because of its novelty and intersectionality, Chinese fintech regulation is underdeveloped relative to traditional finance or technology regulation. Simultaneously, this research is also expected to indicate a general trajectory towards greater regulatory scrutiny towards fintech firms.

Microfinance institutions are considered pivotal in addressing poverty in low- and middle-income countries and providing financial inclusion through loans, savings, and insurance to those typically excluded from traditional banking. Most microloan recipients are women who own small businesses, and thus microfinance is regarded as pivotal to increasing women’s economic status. Some studies, however, highlight the rather lacking ability of microloans to improve household and business outcomes, as well as measures of women’s empowerment. My research explores if targeting such an agenda is the most effective way to uplift women and therefore help economic conditions in middle-income countries. I do this by examining the impact of microfinance loans on women’s autonomy in Vietnam by constructing a panel dataset from the 2006 and 2010 Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys and designing a causal model. One channel through which microfinance empowers a woman is through her ability to financially contribute to the household, which in turn increases her decision-making ability, and thus changes gender relations in the household. In order to test increased decision-making, I calculate the share of resources in the household that are allocated to each woman and estimate changes in resource shares as a result of receiving a microloan. I expect results to show little to no increase in resource shares as the outcome of a household obtaining a microloan. In order to test changes in gender relations, I compare the previous results across Vietnam’s eight regions, which display varying levels of intimate partner violence. I expect regions with high rates of intimate partner violence to be negatively correlated with increased resource shares for women as compared to regions that have low rates of intimate partner violence. By addressing both the economic and social status of women, I illustrate a more complete picture of the efficacy of microfinance.

Policymakers in the United States often express concerns of their state tax base being reduced if taxes are increased because higher taxes will encourage richer taxpayers to relocate. The notion that a taxpayer’s decision to move is influenced by the level of taxation they experience is reinforced by current migration trends. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act placed a limit on the State and Local Tax (SALT) deduction, meaning that high income taxpayers have a limit on how much their state and local tax payments can reduce their federal tax burden. The increase of the share of state and local taxes in the overall tax burden of taxpayers is felt differently based on the level of taxation by state. I researched the extent to which the SALT deduction cap in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act impacts interstate migration in the United States and its variation amongst different income groups. I conducted a difference in differences analysis using Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income interstate migration data and taxation data from 2011 to 2020. There was an increase in the migration outflow from states with high taxation levels caused by the tax code change. Such increase was modest because taxation only marginally influences a person’s decision to relocate, compared to other factors such as job prospects and cost of living. This research shows that while the change in migration from taxation should be considered by state policymakers, the concern that the tax base will dramatically decrease from a tax increase is overblown. This research can be built upon by conducting a similar analysis in five to ten years to measure the long-term effects.

Year after year, catastrophic hurricanes rip through the mainland United States and its island territories. And yet, year after year, we hear stories of communities going without electricity or running water for months, disastrous temporary housing units and evacuations, and months-long wait times for immediate needs like food and medical care. Why has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) failed to improve its distribution of disaster relief, even after three major reform bills? This paper seeks to provide an answer by investigating how corporate lobbying may be influencing FEMA’s allocation of relief funds between public and private actors. Considering the lucrative nature of post-disaster contracts awarded to corporations, they may use their lobbying powers to pressure the government to allocate more funds for private contracts and less to its Public Assistance (PA) program, which provides grants directly to state and local governments. FEMA’s preference for private contractors, despite their extensive history of performing inadequate work and defrauding the government, may be a significant part of the agency’s overall dysfunction. I conduct a multivariate regression analysis to determine the relationship between lobbying expenditures from top contractors and FEMA’s allocation of relief funds among public and private sectors between 2004 and 2021. I expect to find a positive relationship between these variables, suggesting lobbying does interfere with the delivery of post-disaster aid. Identifying the private sector’s influence in this area is critical to ensuring communities are properly supported after hurricanes and other natural disasters, which will only increase in frequency due to climate change.

According to the Corruptions Perception Index, Nepal is ranked 117 out of 180 countries for corruption with 12% of public service users having paid a bribe in the last 12 months. While many studies have analyzed systemic corruption within Nepal, little research has attempted to measure the magnitude of systemic corruption, with particularly limited literature on systemic healthcare corruption. To estimate the prevalence of petty systemic healthcare corruption (i.e. between the public and low-level public officials or doctors), I designed a survey guided by prior United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and European Commission research, and a series of interviews with Nepalis. Bir Hospital was randomly selected among 5 other public hospitals in Kathmandu, and I administered the survey to 41 participants over two days. 43.2% of respondents paid more than they expected, and 68.6% of these respondents felt this payment was outside of their cultural norms. Moreover, 41.7% of the respondents paid cash directly to a doctor, which interviews indicated is atypical. No correlation was found between income and how respondents rated their care; moreover, no statistical significance was found using a t-test between how respondents rated their care and whether they paid cash directly to a doctor. However, odds ratio analysis on whether a payment was outside of cultural norms and whether the desired care was received yielded a ratio of 1.23, indicating that these payments mildly increased the probability of getting the desired care. This, paired with interviews indicating distrust of the hospital system and prior research demonstrating corruption throughout Nepal suggests systemic healthcare corruption in the form of bribes is prevalent, but does not necessarily guarantee better care. Further research must be done to not only determine the efficacy of this survey method, but also the validity of this model.

Donald Trump’s presidency and its divisive legacy on the American government and its citizens continues to plague our society years after he has left office. It is crucial that policymakers and social scientists understand what values or grievances resonated with Trump’s voters and drove the rise of the Make America Great Again movement, in order to ensure that his voters do not continue to feel alienated from mainstream US politics. Through this paper I explore the electoral motivations of the US white working class, building on existing research that studies voting patterns and trends in previous presidential elections. I test two popular competing theories, pocketbook voting and social identity voting, and apply these theories to the context of the 2020 US presidential election. Pocketbook voting posits that voters respond to individual economic incentives and vote for who would benefit them economically, while social identity voting theorizes that individuals vote based on their subjective sense of belonging to an in-group and a desire to distinguish their group from others. I expect to find that white working class Trump voters were motivated by social identity voting, voting for Trump because of racial grievances and status anxieties. To conduct this study, I use a racial threat index and an economic well-being index, drawing from survey data to compare the social and economic grievances of white working class Trump voters. I expect to find that social identity voting, driven by factors such as status anxiety and racial threat, is a stronger electoral motivator than economic incentives, such as changes in wages or employment. Understanding such motivations lets us fight polarization and address the concerns of disenfranchised voters in future elections and in politics more broadly.