What explains variations in how ports are acknowledging and responding to the challenges of climate mitigation and climate adaptation?  This research project examines the response of the top 100 global ports (in terms of tonnage) across the world to the growing challenges posed by climate change. Ports face challenges such as reducing emissions from ships and port operations, and adapting to changes like sea level rise, irregular water flows (crucial for ports on river estuaries), shifts in cargo composition, and changing water dynamics. I will explore whether these ports are acknowledging climate challenges and the extent to which they are establishing clear targets and addressing them in their operational strategies with clear timelines. Moreover, how they are preparing for the eventual decline in global fossil fuel trade. In particular, I will pay special attention to coal-exporting and importing ports, analyzing if they continue to make investments in coal infrastructure and whether they have initiated plans for diversifying their revenue streams to prepare for the eventual phase-out of coal. I have already started collecting data by closely examining the websites of these ports. I will create a database of whether these ports have developed climate statements that identify environmental issues, set clear targets with timelines, and outline strategies to mitigate and adapt to these challenges.  I will combine the scores on these dimensions to create a climate score for each port. In addition to my quantitative analysis based on a dataset created by website research, I will conduct interviews with port officials and union leaders at the Port of Seattle, Tacoma, Everette, and Bellingham.

This project presents an analysis of climate litigation cases on a global level. I have created a unique database of over 969 cases in 74 countries with detailed accounts of the plaintiffs and defendants involved. The primary objective of this study is to assess the spread of environmental litigation cases and the when, where, who, and on what grounds these cases are being brought forth. My preliminary analysis shows that most climate litigation cases have been filed post-2020, with a majority, or 15.04% of cases being initially filed in 2021. Such data emphasizes the substantial growth of climate litigation on a global scale in recent years. Regarding jurisdiction, a majority, or 15.96%, of cases have been filed in Australia. The UK follows closely with 15.84% of climate litigation cases being filed within the country. Additionally, the majority, or 25.28%, of plaintiffs are NGOs with individuals making up the ensuing majority group with around 22.08% involved in bringing forward cases. On the other hand, 49.02%, of defendants are federal government agencies. Regarding the grounds under which these cases are filed, 62.95% of cases have been filed invoking statutory provisions in the relevant national legislation to hold varying actors responsible for climate inaction. I also find that around 36.22% of cases have utilized international law established by custom or treaties recognized by nations. Importantly, my data suggests a new, and growing, trend emerging in climate litigation as plaintiffs invoke human rights laws to seek stronger climate legislation with around 25.39% of cases having relied on this legal framework. Going forward, such a comprehensive climate litigation database will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, practitioners, and climate advocates seeking to navigate and understand the complex landscape of climate litigation. 

In Washington State, voters have expressed conflicting perspectives on state-wide climate initiatives. In the recent 2024 elections, voters narrowly supported I-2066, which prohibited state and local governments from restricting access to natural gas, but rejected I-2117, which sought to overturn Washington’s cap and invest program under the Climate Commitment Act (CCA). Since its enactment, the CCA has generated over $1 billion in tax revenue every year which the state has invested in public goods such as the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. While climate opponents have blamed the CCA for high gas prices, climate supporters have noted the important projects the CCA has funded. We hypothesize that CCA-funded projects have a positive association with the "No I-2117" vote share. Drawing in publicly available data, I have assembled an original database of over 1,000 projects funded by CCA revenue. Using county as the unit of analysis, we are examining if the number or value of these projects correlates with “No I-2117” vote share through an OLS regression analysis. We are controlling for confounding factors such as 2024 Trump vote share, 2024 Ferguson vote share, support for “Yes I-2066,” support for “Yes I-1631” (2018 state initiative that proposed a carbon tax), population share of different racial groups, per capita income, and share of agriculture in the county’s workforce. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the number or value of CCA-funded projects is not correlated with "No I-2117" vote share. However, "No I-2117" vote share has a statistically significant association with "No I-2066" as well as "Ferguson" vote share. These findings can inform the debate on whether framing pro-climate initiatives in terms of their local benefits can increase electoral support.

This paper analyzes Colorado cities’ Climate Action Plans (CAPs) to identify factors that strengthen municipal climate policies, focusing on mitigation and adaptation strategies. Climate change poses significant threats to local economies, infrastructures, and society, prompting cities to develop comprehensive plans that address climate mitigation—reducing greenhouse gas emissions—and adaptation—enhancing resilience to climate-related risks such as rising temperatures, wildfires, droughts, and floods. My research explores how population size, political affiliation, perceived climate risk, and past climate effects influence the relative strength of Colorado cities’ CAPs. Using mixed methods research and comparative analysis, I test four hypotheses: (1) Cities with higher perceived risks of wildfires and droughts create stronger adaptation plans; (2) Cities with a history of climate-related disasters develop stronger adaptation plans; (3) Democratic cities implement stronger mitigation and adaptation plans than Republican cities; and (4) Larger cities focus more on mitigation, while smaller cities create more targeted adaptation strategies. I am creating an original dataset of city Climate Action Plans by drawing on city websites, census reports, risk projection maps, and the political affiliation of city mayors. I am also creating an index to reflect the relative strength of cities’ mitigation and adaptation plans. With this, I am comparing each city’s scores and identifying common variables that may influence the strength of these plans. Preliminary findings suggest that political orientation plays a significant role in the existence and strength of mitigation and adaptation plans. Conversely, population size appears to play a less significant role than anticipated. This paper provides insights into how municipalities in Colorado, an economically, geographically, and politically diverse state, are addressing climate change. This work contributes to the ongoing climate conversation by highlighting the varied approaches cities take in planning for climate change and calls to attention what factors may be creating weaker climate preparedness.

Are human rights non-governmental organizations (HRNGOs) incorporating climate-based rhetoric and actions in their overall agenda, to what extent, and what is driving any shift in that direction? I focus on three main explanations. First, protectionary theory suggests that given the global democracy recession, NGOs have incentives to market themselves as environmental organizations to protect against the persecution faced by human rights groups. Second, financial theory suggests that NGOs could be motivated to incorporate the climate agenda to appeal to larger donor pools for funding. Third, need-based theory suggests that NGOs must solve quality of life challenges (of which climate change is an integral part) before human rights challenges. I hypothesize the transition over to climate rhetoric and action is negatively associated with NGOs’ revenue, and more likely among NGOs working in countries that restrict human rights work. To test my hypotheses, I utilize the Charity Navigator Data set to randomly select a sample of NGOs, both advocacy and service delivery, across four levels of revenue. I then create an original dataset where I code the mission and activities of these organizations as published on their websites using the Wayback Machine for 2010, 2015, 2020, and 2025.  Finally, I test whether this transition is more likely among NGOs working in poor countries with serious quality of life challenges. My preliminary findings provide some evidence in support of my hypotheses, with variation in climate rhetoric uptake based in part on organization size and region of action.