Using the University of Washington and its ties to the fossil fuel and weapons manufacturing industries, this paper investigates how industry funding and other ties to colonial and neoliberal universities impact the knowledge and opinions of students. This study analyzes the nature and extent of these ties using archival data collected via public records requests, UW websites, and interviews with student protestors, and then it cross analyzes this information with data collected from an anonymous cross-sectional survey with nearly 900 UW student participants. This survey gauged student knowledge and opinions on the climate crisis, fossil fuels, and fossil fuel companies, as well as (US) militarism, warfare (especially in the case of “israel’s” genocide in Palestine), and weapons companies. The answers for each question had pre-determined rankings of beneficiality of the represented knowledge/opinions to the fossil fuel or weapons industries, based on industry disinformation campaigns and corporate strategies. My analysis shows that the knowledge and opinions of students in the UW college/school with the most ties to the fossil fuel and weapons industries (the College of Engineering) are more beneficial to the industries than those of other students, and the difference is statistically significant for many of the questions. The same held true when comparing departments within this college based on the extent of their ties to the given industries, and when holding constant other factors such as years completed at UW and courses taken related to the climate crisis. The correlation weakened, disappeared, or reversed when only considering students in their first year at the UW and/or who had not taken any classes related to the climate crisis, thus providing evidence that the relationship is causative, supporting the hypothesis that university-corporate ties cause students to develop knowledge and opinions that are beneficial to the industry. 

The findings of this study make sense in the context of, and may bolster, existing research on colonial harms of universities, the relationship between industry funding and research agendas and results, university-corporate ties, and student to industry pipelines. However, none of these specifically study the influence of university-corporate ties on student knowledge and opinions, so this study fills in this important gap in research. This contribution will be important to not only related research but to student movements across the country and their campaigns to urge their universities to cut ties with corporations, particularly those against the fossil fuel and weapons industries at the University of Washington.

In Washington State, voters have expressed conflicting perspectives on state-wide climate initiatives. In the recent 2024 elections, voters narrowly supported I-2066, which prohibited state and local governments from restricting access to natural gas, but rejected I-2117, which sought to overturn Washington’s cap and invest program under the Climate Commitment Act (CCA). Since its enactment, the CCA has generated over $1 billion in tax revenue every year which the state has invested in public goods such as the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. While climate opponents have blamed the CCA for high gas prices, climate supporters have noted the important projects the CCA has funded. We hypothesize that CCA-funded projects have a positive association with the "No I-2117" vote share. Drawing in publicly available data, I have assembled an original database of over 1,000 projects funded by CCA revenue. Using county as the unit of analysis, we are examining if the number or value of these projects correlates with “No I-2117” vote share through an OLS regression analysis. We are controlling for confounding factors such as 2024 Trump vote share, 2024 Ferguson vote share, support for “Yes I-2066,” support for “Yes I-1631” (2018 state initiative that proposed a carbon tax), population share of different racial groups, per capita income, and share of agriculture in the county’s workforce. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the number or value of CCA-funded projects is not correlated with "No I-2117" vote share. However, "No I-2117" vote share has a statistically significant association with "No I-2066" as well as "Ferguson" vote share. These findings can inform the debate on whether framing pro-climate initiatives in terms of their local benefits can increase electoral support.

This paper analyzes Colorado cities’ Climate Action Plans (CAPs) to identify factors that strengthen municipal climate policies, focusing on mitigation and adaptation strategies. Climate change poses significant threats to local economies, infrastructures, and society, prompting cities to develop comprehensive plans that address climate mitigation—reducing greenhouse gas emissions—and adaptation—enhancing resilience to climate-related risks such as rising temperatures, wildfires, droughts, and floods. My research explores how population size, political affiliation, perceived climate risk, and past climate effects influence the relative strength of Colorado cities’ CAPs. Using mixed methods research and comparative analysis, I test four hypotheses: (1) Cities with higher perceived risks of wildfires and droughts create stronger adaptation plans; (2) Cities with a history of climate-related disasters develop stronger adaptation plans; (3) Democratic cities implement stronger mitigation and adaptation plans than Republican cities; and (4) Larger cities focus more on mitigation, while smaller cities create more targeted adaptation strategies. I am creating an original dataset of city Climate Action Plans by drawing on city websites, census reports, risk projection maps, and the political affiliation of city mayors. I am also creating an index to reflect the relative strength of cities’ mitigation and adaptation plans. With this, I am comparing each city’s scores and identifying common variables that may influence the strength of these plans. Preliminary findings suggest that political orientation plays a significant role in the existence and strength of mitigation and adaptation plans. Conversely, population size appears to play a less significant role than anticipated. This paper provides insights into how municipalities in Colorado, an economically, geographically, and politically diverse state, are addressing climate change. This work contributes to the ongoing climate conversation by highlighting the varied approaches cities take in planning for climate change and calls to attention what factors may be creating weaker climate preparedness.

Senate Republicans are no longer supporting environmental policy, breaking a longstanding history of tacit support for such legislation. This occurrence is drastically highlighted in former President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022. While policy stance change is not an atypical occurrence in Congressional behavior, it usually coalesces with legislation that fails to advance a party’s given agenda. This stipulation was not present within the IRA; it championed the Republican Party’s desires for domestic American manufacturing and industry, while simultaneously investing in US-based technologies. Why are Republicans no longer supporting legislation that reflects their historical and modern values? This study will test whether the level of polarized messaging within official Republican Party Platforms impacts the frequency of Congressional opposition towards ecological policy. I theorize that Republican Senators downvoted the IRA bill of 2022 to demonstrate ideological compliance with the 2024 GOP Party Platform. As dictated by the platform, it is in these representative’s electoral interest to oppose any ‘liberal agenda’ (even while sacrificing advancement of Republican domestic manufacturing goals) due to the increase of anti-left rhetoric and blame purported by the Republican Party. I hypothesize that increased polarization rhetoric within such documents will produce increased levels of opposing votes towards ecological policy from Republican Senators. I will first conduct a sentiment analysis of GOP and Democratic Platforms spanning from 1988 through 2024 to establish a metric of polarization level per document. Then, the roll call votes of all Senators for the 63 relevant bills will be used to conduct a regression analysis, determining whether higher polarized party documents produced higher levels of opposing votes.

Are nations holding true to their commitments to address climate change, and why or why not? On November 4th, 2016, the Paris Agreement (PA) went into force, creating a legally binding international treaty on climate change with the overall goal of limiting the increase of the global average temperature from 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This agreement is unique from others in that countries can build their own goals, dubbed Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These NDCs refer to national climate action plans that each country made for itself under the PA, outlining how it plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) to meet the 2 degrees Celsius goal. Many countries have created ambitious targets, and some have even been credible in following through on their commitments. However, there is great variation across countries in levels of ambition, and therefore in progress and implementation of NDCs. While 195 countries have signed the PA, we are still on track to surpass 2 degrees of warming early- to mid-century. It is thus crucial to investigate what drives environmental action and inaction, especially on a domestic level. In my work, I address the question “what domestic factors impede or bolster the implementation of climate action in regard to NDCs?” using regression analysis to systematically test the impact of domestic factors on nations’ progress towards meeting their self-imposed CO2 emission reduction goals.

Are human rights non-governmental organizations (HRNGOs) incorporating climate-based rhetoric and actions in their overall agenda, to what extent, and what is driving any shift in that direction? I focus on three main explanations. First, protectionary theory suggests that given the global democracy recession, NGOs have incentives to market themselves as environmental organizations to protect against the persecution faced by human rights groups. Second, financial theory suggests that NGOs could be motivated to incorporate the climate agenda to appeal to larger donor pools for funding. Third, need-based theory suggests that NGOs must solve quality of life challenges (of which climate change is an integral part) before human rights challenges. I hypothesize the transition over to climate rhetoric and action is negatively associated with NGOs’ revenue, and more likely among NGOs working in countries that restrict human rights work. To test my hypotheses, I utilize the Charity Navigator Data set to randomly select a sample of NGOs, both advocacy and service delivery, across four levels of revenue. I then create an original dataset where I code the mission and activities of these organizations as published on their websites using the Wayback Machine for 2010, 2015, 2020, and 2025.  Finally, I test whether this transition is more likely among NGOs working in poor countries with serious quality of life challenges. My preliminary findings provide some evidence in support of my hypotheses, with variation in climate rhetoric uptake based in part on organization size and region of action.