The representation of genocide in the post-conflict period is paramount in shaping public opinion and, in turn, providing relief, aid, and justice for the victims. Two common forms of representation of violence in genocide are statistics and the memory of survivors. Data and statistics add a viewable representation in graphs, tables, and charts. However, data and statistics can be manipulated and changed to suit one's biases. One of the most prevalent forms of memory in post-genocide periods is testimony. It can be intensely personal and can provide narratives for oppressed people during the conflict. However, testimony can be altered by trauma and memory of the witness and can be influenced by an interviewer. This presentation explores the delicate balance of memory and statistical representation in a post-genocide period, primarily in the Guatemalan Genocide. It contains an analysis of data on victims that was collected by the Guatemalan police during the genocide, widely published testimonials, and personal stories about the genocide. A mix of testimony and data representation can provide additional and nuanced insight into violent conflicts and help to create a peaceful and just society. Considering testimony and data together instead of completely separate entities fits with established and proven genocide prevention efforts.

This paper investigates the impacts that asymmetric information has on private pediatric health insurance coverage. In order to do so, I use the Rothschild and Stiglitz model of equilibria in perfectly competitive insurance markets and apply it to pediatric health insurance. It examines the shifts that occur in the model due to exogenous changes from asymmetric information between insurers and parents. These information problems occur in three forms; moral hazard, when people consume more care because they have health insurance; the principal-agent problem, when a task is delegated to an agent and the principal cannot directly observe the agent's actions; and adverse selection, when the consumer of health insurance has more information than the provider. These information asymmetries affect the behavior of both consumers and suppliers of pediatric health insurance, and so results in changes of supply and demand of insurance contracts. Ideally, in an equilibrium contract, consumers would recieve maximum utility, firms would make non-negative profits, and no other possible contracts would have the potential to make the firms greater non-negative profits. However, due to the changes in supply and demand from asymmetric information, this efficient outcome can become harder to obtain. By examining the changes that happen in the market with the modified Rothschild and Stiglitz model, I examine the the existence of equilibrium points, as well as the anticipated effects on health insurance coverage and health insurance prices. Because there are so many possible events that can occur, such as changes in parental income and risk, and the uncertainty of the magnitude of those events, no concrete conslusions can be made. It can however, be said that pediatric health insurance coverage may change in the presence of asymmetric information.